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EXPLAINING THE SWOLLEN MIDDLE:
WHY MOST TRANSACTIONS ARE A MIX OF "MARKET " AND "HIERARCHY"
Why are firms sometimes more efficient than markets at organizing
transactions? Why are most transactions arrayed neither at the pure
"market" nor at the pure "hierarchy" end of the continuum, but
rather in the "swollen middle"? Why don't firms make greater use
of price incentives? This paper addresses these three questions by
developing a model of the choice of institution.
One key building block is the distinction between organizing
methods (hierarchy and the price system) and institutions (firms
and markets) . Hierarchy and the price system are two distinct
methods for organizing transactions. The paper focuses on the
enforcement properties of both methods. Hierarchy controls
individuals directly by constraining behavior, while prices do it
indirectly by measuring output. Each system has its own biases:
using prices minimize shirking costs but maximize cheating costs,
while relying on hierarchy results in the opposite bias. Organizing
costs are the sum of shirking and cheating costs. Any given
transaction will be organized by the mix of behavior and price
constraints that minimize organizing costs. A transaction will be
organized within a firm if the reduction in cheating costs achieved
by replacing price constraints by behavior constraints exceeds the
resulting increase in shirking costs.
The paper shows that the concentration of transactions in the
swollen middle can be explained by the increasing cost of shirking
and cheating as one increases the proportion of behavior or price
constraints. Examples drawn from agriculture, the exchange of
reputation, and the purchase of marketing services show that the
model helps explain the particular institutional arrangements
common in these industries. Finally, the paper explains the costs
of using two types of price incentives in firms, piecework and
profit centers, and predicts when they will be used.
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if the reduction in cheating costs achieved by replacing price constraints by
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The paper shows that the concentration of transactions in the swollen middle can
be explained by the increasing cost of shirking and cheating as one increases
the proportion of behavior or price constraints. Examples drawn from agriculture,
the exchange of reputation, and the purchase of marketing services show that the
model helps explain the particular institutional arrangements common in these
industries. Finally, the paper explains the costs of using two types of price
incentives in firms, piecework and profit centers, and predicts when they will
be used.
1. Introduction.
Since its emergence in the mid-70s (Williamson, 1975), transaction costs
economics (TCE) has shown itself to be a very useful tool for explaining
economic institutions, both domestic and international. Yet the paradigm is
not without its critics. This paper addresses two fundamental criticisms
leveled against transaction costs theory. First, transaction cost theory is
only a theory of market failure— it does not explain why firms succeed
(Demsetz, 1988). Second, as Perrow (1986) asserts, the categories of "market"
and "hierarchy" used in transaction costs theory are not useful; observation
shows that most transactions cannot be categorized as either "pure market" nor
"pure hierarchy" (Powell, 1987; Stinchcombe, 1990).
The tendency of some of the writings in TCE has been to rely on the
presence of transaction costs in markets to explain why firms internalize a
transaction. It seems clear, however, that the presence of market transaction
costs is not a sufficient condition for internalization. Organizing exchange
and cooperation is costly, and while TCE has mostly focused on organizing
costs in markets (transaction costs), one must also realize that firms also
incur organizing costs. It is in fact perfectly plausible that firms, in their
attempt to internalize market failures, experience higher organizing costs
than markets. If organizing costs in firms are so high that they absorb all of
the gains from exchange and coordination, then no economic interaction will
take place, either within firms or in markets. A complete theory of economic
institutions should therefore consider simultaneously the costs of organizing
transactions in markets (market transaction costs) and those of effecting
exchange within the firm (internal organizing costs), and should explain how
firms can achieve lower organizing costs than markets. This requires a theory
of the organizing method(s) used by firms, and of the costs and benefits of
those methods relative to those used in markets.
Proponents of TCE have argued that a firm can avoid market transaction
costs by internalizing the transaction. But a firm that internalizes does not
avoid the market. Instead it shifts the transaction from the market for
intermediate inputs to that for labor. A firm which fears being held up by a
supplier of raw materials can buy it out, and transform its owner into an
employee. While this action eliminates transaction costs in the market for raw
materials, the firm must now incur the cost of monitoring the new employee. As
Grossman and Hart (1986, p. 692) explain,
Given that it is difficult to write a complete contract between a buyer
and a seller, and this creates room for opportunistic behavior, the
transaction-cost based arguments for integration do not explain how the
scope for such behavior changes when one of the self-interested owners
becomes an equally self-interested employee of the other owner.
Why then is organizing within the firm sometimes preferable to organizing
in markets? At one extreme, some argue that firms are superior to markets
because they can establish an internal market when the external market is
missing or is subject to high transaction costs. At the other extreme stand
those who argue that what gives firms a comparative advantage is the use of
fiat.
Rugman (1981, p. 28) provides a clear statement of the first view. He
argues that
Internalization is the process of making a market within a firm... The
internal prices (or transfer prices) of the firm lubricate the organiza-
tion and permit the internal market to function as efficiently as a
potential (but unrealized) regular market.
If the reason why firms are more efficient than markets was their
replacement of external by internal prices, then we should observe widespread
use of internal markets in firms. Although this concept of "internal markets"
accounts for some of the features observed in firms, it fails to capture what
is distinctive about the way economic activity is organized within firms
(Hennart, 1986). The productive activity of most employees is not directed by
prices but by directives from their superiors. In multidivisional firms
divisions do not use shadow prices to guide intra-divisional transactions. As
shown by Eccles and White (1988), their use for inter-divisional coordination
is subject to significant distortions which limit their effectiveness. 1
If the use of price incentives in firms is subject to serious limita-
tions, what makes firms more efficient than markets? For Williamson (1975, 29-
30), it is the use of authority. Disputes are easier to resolve in firms than
in markets because a boss has authority over employees: internal auditors have
easier access to information than external ones, and their fact-finding
missions are likely to elicit more cooperation. Intrafirm disputes can also be
resolved by managerial fiat, a procedure that is faster and less costly than
adjudication through the courts, the main method available to market par-
ticipants.
This view that the main advantage of firms over markets stems from the use
of authority has been criticized by Alchian and Demsetz (1972, p. 777), who
argue that a boss has no more power over his employees than over an indepen-
dent contractor:
It is common to see the firm characterized by the power to settle
disputes by fiat, or by disciplinary action superior to that available
in the conventional market. This is delusion. The firm does not own all
its inputs. It has no power of fiat, no authority, no disciplinary
action any different in the slightest degree from ordinary market
contracting between any two people. I can "punish" you only by with-
holding future business or by seeking redress in the courts for any
failure to honor our exchange agreement. That is exactly all that any
employer can do. He can fire or sue, just like I can fire my grocer by
stopping purchases from him or sue him for delivering faulty products .
Grossman and Hart (1986, p. 695) have also denied that common governance
reduces information asymmetries, arguing that "any audits that an employer can
have done on his subsidiary are also feasible when the subsidiary is a
separate company".
In short, there is considerable debate on the exact reasons why orga-
nizing within firms can be more efficient than organizing through the market.
The problem of isolating what makes firms efficient is also complicated
by the presence of market-like processes in firms (such as profit centers and
piece work) . This brings us to the second major criticism of TCE. Perrow
(1986, p. 255) argues that TCE neglects the complexity of actual institutions
by focusing on the two extremes of markets and hierarchy. According to Perrow,
There are strong elements of markets within hierarchies. On the other
hand, markets have strong elements of hierarchy within them. The
distinction between markets and hierarchies is greatly overdrawn. The
continuum from market to hierarchy is less like a ruler than a football,
with a vanishing small pure type at each end, and a swollen middle that
mixes the two (as Sidney Winter once put it in a seminar ).. .Very little
of organizational life remains at the two ends of the 'football*".
This brief review of the literature suggests that a theory of economic
institutions must explain why and when firms are more efficient than markets.
However, this is not enough. It must also explain the "swollen middle," the
fact that a large percentage of economic exchanges are a mixture of market and
hierarchy. This paper builds such a theory.
Section 2 develops a theory of what makes firms efficient by contrasting
two polar organizing methods, the price system and hierarchy. The model builds
upon transaction costs economics (McManus, 1972; Williamson, 1975, 1985;
Ouchi, 1977, 1979; Hennart, 1982, 1986; Buckley and Casson, 1985; Barney and
Ouchi, 1986; Masten, 1988), property rights theory (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972;
Alchian, 1984; Grossman and Hart, 1986; Demsetz, 1988; Barzel and Suen, 1988)
and on agency theory (for surveys see Levinthal, 1988 and Eisenhardt, 1989).
Section 3 demonstrates how the model accounts for the wide variety of
institutional forms used in organizing two particular transactions: the
transfer of reputation and the procurement of marketing services. One impor-
tant implication of the model developed in this paper is that re-introducing
market processes within firms incurs increasing costs. This point is developed
in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes the argument of the paper.
2 . A Model of the Choice between Firms and Markets .
This section develops a model of the factors influencing the choice
between firms and markets based on a comparison of the costs of cheating and
shirking. The argument consists of six basic propositions:
1. One must distinguish between methods of organizing (the price system and
hierarchy) and economic institutions (markets and firms). There is no one-to-
one correspondence between the two, and any given institution may, under
specific circumstances, use a mix of both methods of organization.
2. The two organizing methods, the price system and hierarchy, use different
techniques to organize economic activities. The price system rewards agents on
the basis of their outputs; hierarchy rewards on the basis of behavior
(inputs). In a world of zero transaction costs, both would be equally effec-
tive (Coase, 1937). With positive organizing costs, each technique will
experience divergent levels of costs for a given transaction.
3. The cost of using price constraints (cheating cost) is the cost of
measuring output, plus the losses due to fraud when measurement is imperfect.
The cost of using hierarchy is that of using behavior constraints. This cost,
which we call "shirking cost", is the sum of the cost of constraining behavior
plus the residual amount of shirking due to imperfect behavior constraints.
4. Price constraints minimize shirking but encourage cheating; behavior
constraints minimize cheating but encourage shirking. The choice between using
prices and hierarchy will depend on the relative costs of measuring output
plus that of tolerating the residual amount of cheating as compared to those
of constraining behavior and of bearing the residual amount of shirking.
5. Markets are institutions that predominantly use the price method of
organizing. Firms predominantly rely on hierarchy. However, because of
diminishing returns to measuring output and constraining behavior, both firms
and markets will often use a mix of price and behavior constraints. The firm's
mix will contain a high proportion of behavior relative to price constraints;
the mix in markets will be biased towards price constraints.
6. The combination of price and behavior constraints defines a wide variety of
institutional forms along a continuum which goes from pure spot markets to
traditional firms. The model explains why the most common institutional forms
use both methods of organizing.
These propositions are more fully developed in the pages that follow.
2.1 Organizing Methods vs. Economic Institutions
The starting point of our analysis is the distinction between methods of
organizing (the price system and hierarchy) and economic institutions (markets
and firms). Prices and what we call "hierarchy" are methods used to organize
economic activities. Markets and firms are institutions which use one or both
methods to achieve that goal. Although markets predominantly use prices as
methods of organizing and firms rely principally on hierarchy, there is not a
one-to-one correspondence between prices and markets and hierarchy and firms.
Thus firms may develop internal pricing systems and markets may use behavioral
constraints. Indeed, as we will show below, it is generally efficient to use a
mix of both methods of organizing in firms as well as in markets.
2.2 Markets and Firms in the Absence of Organizing Costs
Cooperation between individuals can be productive, either because some
tasks are best achieved through pooling of effort or because individuals have
differing abilities and they can exploit these differences through exchange.
However, achieving cooperation is not costless. Parties to the interaction
must be made aware of the potential gains of cooperation. The gains of
cooperation are joint, so a formula for dividing those gains must be imposed
on the parties to curb bargaining. And this sharing rule must be enforced. All
of these activities carry a price tag.
Achieving cooperation would be costless if such activities were unneces-
sary. This would be the case if individuals had unlimited abilities and were
perfectly selfless. In the real world, individuals have "bounded rationality"
and they are opportunistic (Williamson, 1975). It will then be necessary to
incur the costs of informing parties, rewarding them for productive behavior,
and curbing bargaining. These information, bargaining, and enforcement costs
are the costs of organizing economic activities. They must be borne when using
either method of organizing, whether it is the price system or hierarchy.
Because the price system and hierarchy use different incentive and information
structures, they experience divergent costs when organizing a given transac-
tion. Each method will therefore have a comparative advantage in organizing a
particular set of transactions. Assuming some degree of competition which
penalizes the use of inefficient methods, then the method of organizing that
will be used to organize a transaction will be the least costly.
The following paragraphs briefly describe how the price system and
hierarchy organize economic activities in the absence of bounded rationality
and opportunism. This allows us to separate the description of the basic
method of organizing from the actual performance of these methods of orga-
nizing when organizing costs are positive. To simplify our discussion, the
emphasis will be on enforcement costs. 3 Let us first turn to the price system.
Prices perform the three tasks of organizing: they inform parties, they
curb bargaining, and they provide rewards and punishments. In the absence of
transaction costs (when there are perfectly defined property rights with
costless enforcement, zero information costs, and a large number of buyers and
sellers), prices convey information on the consequences of one's actions so as
to allow parties to reach optimal decisions on the allocation of tasks. The
information structure of a market is fully decentralized, and each party
receives through prices information about everyone else's needs and desires,
and adapts to it in a way that maximizes joint welfare. When markets function
in this way, prices are exogenous and bargaining doesn't pay. Prices meter and
reward perfectly an agent's behavior; the gross rewards that agents receive is
a direct function of their output times those market prices.
In the absence of organizing costs, hierarchy would also organize
economic activities perfectly. The hierarchical method of organizing is
characterized by centralized information and the use of behavior constraints.
(Recall that we define hierarchy as a method of organizing—hierarchy is not
synonymous here with "firm" nor with "upper level managers"). Thus, while
information is decentralized with prices, it is centralized with hierarchy.
Under hierarchy individuals (employees) are asked to channel the information
they possess to a central party who assimilates this information and retrans-
mits relevant parts of it back to the employee in the form of directives. With
unbounded rationality, this is as efficient a method of making optimal
decisions on the allocation of tasks as the decentralized system of market
prices.
Individuals who organize their interactions through the price system
collect their own information and make their own productive decisions. They
are rewarded in proportion to their output measured at market prices. Their
rewards serve as incentives to collect the best information possible and to
act on it. By contrast, under hierarchy, the individual agrees to have the
central party (the boss) direct the allocation of his or her own resources
(such as his or her labor-time and effort). The employee agrees to do as told,
within the constraints of social custom. Under these conditions, no rational
individual would permit to let someone else direct his productive behavior if
he was rewarded by his output measured at market prices. He then would have to
bear the cost of being ordered to perform tasks that do not maximize his
income. Consequently, employees are not rewarded by their output measured at
market prices, but instead by their obedience to managerial directives. In
other words, while prices indirectly guide behavior by rewarding output,
hierarchy directly controls individuals by specifying behavior and rewarding
compliance. Because employees are not rewarded by their output, they will be
less concerned about the allocation of their resources. Direction of tasks
will therefore be easily performed by fiat.
2.3 Prices and Hierarchy with Positive Organizing Costs
In the real world, with its bounded rationality and opportunism, the
price system and hierarchy both incur costs in organizing economic activities.
But because of the differences in the way they perform this task, each method
of organizing will incur a different type of costs. The efficiency of the
price system will be reduced by the cost of cheating, while hierarchy will
suffer shirking costs.
For prices to efficiently guide individual action to reap the benefits of
exchange and coordination, they must reflect the value of goods and services.
This in turn presupposes that the value of the output produced can be perfect-
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ly measured by the interacting parties. In reality, bounded rationality will
make measurement costs positive and output will be imperfectly measured. Hence
prices will not provide the "right" signals: agents will be incited to use too
much of the goods whose price is below cost, and too little of the goods
priced below its benefit to the group. Similarly, when the number of buyers
and sellers falls, prices are no longer exogenous, and it will pay for agents
to invest in bargaining. When the number of buyers and sellers is large and
consumers are perfectly informed, competition will weed out dishonest traders,
since they will not get repeat business. A small number of parties (a thin
market), on the other hand, makes it difficult to switch partners, and this
reduces the self-enforcing properties of markets.
Because measuring outputs experiences diminishing returns, it will not
pay to attempt to measure outputs perfectly. Measurement costs will be
incurred up to the point where the marginal cost of measurement equals its
marginal benefit. This will make it possible for traders to cheat. For
example, farmers may surreptitiously add water to the milk they sell to
dairies, or may sell milk contaminated with pesticides, and yet charge dairies
the price of unadulterated milk. The dairy could perform extensive tests on
each batch of milk, but the cost is likely to be prohibitive. Instead, it may
perform limited tests on some of the milk it purchases, and accept some
cheating because it is not worth curbing. The organizing costs incurred by the
price system (as far as enforcement is concerned) are referred to as cheating
costs , and they are the sum of the cost of measuring output plus the cost of
the residual amount of cheating due to imperfect measurement.
When cheating costs are high, a switch to hierarchy may reduce organizing
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costs. Hierarchy reduces cheating by reducing the incentives individuals have
to cheat. It does this by breaking the connection between outputs and rewards.
Individuals are paid a fixed sum to follow orders, and thus gain little from
cheating.
Such a system of rewards independent from outputs has one unavoidable
consequence: while it reduces cheating, it also reduces incentives to work.
When agents governed by prices (self-employed individuals) take the day off,
their output suffers. Since lowered output decreases their reward, they pay
the full cost of their loafing. Employees, on the other hand, have less
incentive to generate output, because their reward is no longer directly
proportional to that output measured at market prices. As long as their
behavior is costly to monitor, employees will have incentives to shirk, i.e to
break the spirit or the letter of their promise to do as told. Note that
shirking does not necessarily mean loafing. It means that the behavior of an
employee will differ from what it would be if he were self-employed.
Employers will therefore have to invest resources to monitor and direct the
behavior of employees. The amount of shirking will depend on the extent to
which the employee's goals differ from those of the employer and on the cost
of constraining employee behavior. There are likely to be diminishing returns
to constraining employee behavior, so it will not pay to totally eliminate
shirking. Shirking costs , one of the costs of using hierarchy, will therefore
be the sum of the costs of constraining behavior and of those of bearing the
residual amount of shirking. In summary, the two methods of organizing, the
price system and hierarchy, are essentially substitutes: switching from prices
to hierarchy reduces cheating, but at the cost of increasing shirking.
12
2.4. The Choice between Firms and Markets
Shirking costs and cheating costs tend to differ across activities. Some
activities, for which output is relatively easy to measure but for which
behavior is difficult to direct and monitor, will be organized most efficient-
ly through prices. For other activities, it may be difficult to measure all
the relevant dimensions of output, but relatively easy to constrain behavior.
These activities will be organized through hierarchy.
The argument made so far is summarized in Figure 1. Total organizing
costs (CS 1 ) are the sum of cheating costs (line CC ) and shirking costs (line
SS
' ) (recall that shirking and cheating costs are the sum of the costs of
enforcement and the residual amount of loss; alternatively, they can be
thought of the total amount of loss sustained in the absence of enforcement).
Moving from the left to the right of the figure means replacing price con-
straints by behavior constraints. As behavior constraints replace price
constraints, the level of cheating costs (CC) falls and the level of shirking
costs (SS') rises, and vice-versa as price constraints replace behavior
constraints. This reflects our assertion that increased shirking is a neces-
sary consequence of reducing cheating, while reducing shirking automatically
increases cheating. The institution chosen will be that for which total
organizing costs, CS
'
, the sum of cheating and shirking costs, is lowest. In
the figure, H represents a pure hierarchical solution (zero price constraints,
100 percent behavior constraints). This institution will be chosen if the
reduction in cheating costs achieved by replacing all price constraints by
behavior constraints exceeds the resulting increase in shirking cost (Figure
la). Similarly, M represents a pure price solution (100 percent price con-
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straints, zero behavior constraints), and will be chosen in the opposite case
(Figure lb). The type of transactions found in markets are clustered at M,
while those found in firms are at H. As argued earlier, the level of shirking
relative to cheating costs, and hence the institution chosen to govern the
transaction, will vary from transaction to transaction.
An example may clarify the argument. Agricultural production requires
the cooperation of two inputs, land and labor. In some cases these two inputs
can be owned in requisite quantities by the same person (the family farm), but
in others the two inputs are held by separate individuals. One observes a
variety of ways in which these inputs are coordinated. In the market solution
the landowner rents land to the owner of labor in exchange for a fixed payment
corresponding to the value of the land, leaving the tenant free to make
production decisions as he/she sees fit. Under a hierarchical solution, the
landowner hires labor for a fixed salary, directs production, and monitors
labor's behavior.
The relative biases observed in these alternative arrangements illustrate
the points made above. Land possesses many attributes beyond its physical
surface, such as the soil nutrients, the improvements, and the trees growing
on it. Since most of these characteristics are inputs into farming, their use
can increase the tenant's income. If it is difficult for the landlord to
measure the tenant's use of these inputs, then the tenant can obtain them at a
low or zero price, and he/she can be expected to maximize his/her income by
overexploiting the inputs, depleting their stock faster than the landowner
would if he were exploiting the land himself. On the other hand, the tenant
farmer has strong incentives to exercise maximum effort and initiative in
14
farming, since he gets to keep the proceeds (less the fixed rent). Thus,
tenant farming maximizes effort and initiative, but it also entails over-
exhaustion of those characteristics of the land that are difficult to measure
(Table l). 8
The biases of employing farm laborers are exactly opposite. An employee
governed by hierarchy has no incentives to run down the land, since his pay is
not function of the output. On the other hand, an employee has little incen-
tive to expend energy and initiative, for the very same reason. If, as argued
above, cooperating parties choose the system of organizing that minimizes the
total cost of coordination, then the choice between rental arrangements (the
market relationship) and a pure employment relationship (hierarchy) will
depend on a comparison of two types of costs: (1) the extent of the losses
that can be inflicted by a tenant overexploiting the rented land (cheating
costs) and (2) the extent of the shirking losses that result when the employee
does not show care and effort in the performance of his duties (Barzel and
Suen, 1988).
The factors that govern the choice of actual agricultural institutions
seem consistent with this model. Binswanger and Rosensweig (1983) note that
rental contracts are rare for land with trees whose continued value depends on
pruning and maintenance, as in the case of coffee, cocoa, and apples. On the
other hand, coconuts do not require pruning, and tenancy in coconut trees is
quite common in India. For the same reasons, land is commonly rented in the
U.S. to grow annual crops, but rarely in the case of land planted with fruit
and nut trees. These constitute a major investment that could be readily run
down by an unscrupulous tenant (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978). Thus land
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which could be subject to substantial "cheating" is not rented. Furthermore,
evidence shows that employment contracts are used in agriculture only when
opportunities for shirking are limited, that is for tasks that are relatively
easy to monitor, and where the activity is effort-intensive, but not care
intensive. This is the case where a large number of workers are concentrated
in a small area, and where the work reguires effort, but little care and
judgment— for example harvesting cotton (Fenoaltea, 1984). When activities are
spatially dispersed, involve the use of capital subject to abuse, or reguire
individual judgment and initiative, shirking costs rise, and the use of hired
labor diminishes.
2.5 Hybrid Institutions
Figure 1 assumes that there is a linear relationship between the level of
constraints and the amount of shirking/cheating. If this is the case, imposing
a mix of behavior and price constraints will never minimize total organizing
costs. However, most actual institutional arrangements do combine both price
and behavior constraints. Transactions commonly referred to as market arrange-
ments are governed mainly by prices but also often include behavior con-
straints. Borrowing money is a market transaction. Yet it often involves the
imposition of a significant number of behavior constraints. For example, bond
covenants usually limit dividend payments, future debt issues, and specify
minimum levels of working capital (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Market transfer
of knowledge through licensing is usually accompanied by various restrictions
on the behavior of the technology buyer, curtailing his right to export the
product manufactured under license (Caves, Crookel, and Killing, 1983).
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Similarly, employment relationships which consist essentially of direc-
tives specifying behavior sometimes use prices to indirectly control some
aspect of that behavior. About one-quarter of all workers in U.S. manufactur-
ing industries in the mid-70s (and 23 percent of all farm labor in 1959) were
not remunerated solely in function of their obedience to managerial direc-
tives, but were paid, at least in part, in relation to their marginal product
(Seiler, 1984). Piece work schemes, bonuses paid to employees, and stock
option plans, are examples of this type of arrangements. Such pay schemes are
especially widespread at upper levels: bonuses made up 31 percent of the total
compensation received by Executive Vice-Presidents in 1986 (Reibstein, 1987).
Figure 2 shows what happens when the level of cheating and shirking costs
increases non-linearly as one specializes into one method of organizing. The
minimum of total organizing costs (CS') is then attained in institutions which
combine price and behavior constraints. This is because it becomes prohibi-
tively costly to use either pure hierarchical or price methods. In that case,
it will pay to combine the two organizing methods. Hence the use of behavior
constraints in what are still thought as market transactions, and the use of
price constraints within firms.
To better understand the situation depicted in Figure 2, we return to our
earlier agricultural example. Consider the case in which the land attributes
that must be protected from overuse (or in which the renter must be encouraged
to invest) are so few in number or of so little value as inputs as to make the
complete switch from a lease to a full-blown employment contract unprofitable.
The landowner may then impose behavior constraints on the few attributes of
land which are economically valuable but difficult to measure ex post. The
17
landlord will draft a lease with clauses stipulating the "type of plowing
permissible, the number and type of crops allowed, and instructions concerning
manures and commercial fertilizers" (Reid, 1973, p. 119). Limited behavior
constraints will thus supplement a core of price constraints. Such "contracts"
cluster around T in Figure 2.
The greater the number of ways in which the renter can affect land
quality, the more costly it will be to write such contracts. Renters will balk
at contracts specifying in detail their behavior, since they alone bear the
pecuniary consequences of the agricultural practices followed. Hence a renter
will accept increased landowner direction of his behavior only if the land-
owner can be made to share the monetary consequences. Sharecropping, in which
both landowner and renter get paid from the joint product of their inputs
(land and labor) will be the preferred solution when land quality can be
significantly affected by the renter in ways which are somewhat difficult to
detect ex post and when constraining the behavior of workers is relatively
costly as well. Compared to a pure rent, sharecropping reduces the renter's
incentive to abuse the land; however, because it weakens the link between
output and reward, sharecropping may also increase his incentive to shirk
(Barzel and Suen, 1988 ). 10
As the costs of controlling overexploitation (cheating) by the tenant
increase, the landowner may decide to completely replace the lease agreement
with an employment contract. But if the cost of constraining employee behavior
is very high, the increase in shirking costs may be significant. The landlord
may then choose to curb opportunities for shirking through behavior con-
straints but to incorporate some of the motivating features of the price
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system (and put up with the resultant amount of cheating). Piece-work schemes
would be introduces into what are essentially employment contracts. An example
of this modified employment relationship is found in the Philippines, where
labor hired for cutting sugarcane is paid almost exclusively by piece rates.
All dimensions of performance are easy to measure: the number of canepoints
cut reflects the quantity of output. Cane cutters may have a tendency to
conserve on effort by not cutting the canepoints close to the ground, but this
form of shirking can be easily detected by observing the field after harvest-
ing (Roumasset and Uy, 1980).
Figures 1 and 2 show that the imposition of behavior constraints (and the
concomitant relaxation of price constraints) is a necessary condition for the
reduction of cheating costs, and hence for the existence of firms. Indeed
firms make widespread use of pure employment contracts in which employees are
rewarded entirely in function of their obedience to managerial directives.
Because the level of shirking may in some activities grow more than propor-
tionally as behavior constraints replace price constraints, firms may re-
introduce price constraints alongside behavior constraints. Therefore it is
the relative emphasis on price versus behavior constraints that differentiates
firms from markets: in firms behavior constraints dominate, while in markets
price constraints are dominant. It is not because they mimic the price system
that firms can sometimes incur lower organizing costs than markets, but
because they replace price constraints with behavior constraints. In some
cases the high cost of establishing a pure system of behavior constraints may
lead them to selectively reintroduce some degree of price constraints, but
behavior constraints will still be the firm's primary organizing method.
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Lastly, while there are clear conceptual differences between prices and
hierarchy as methods of organizing, the distinction between "firm" and
"market" is sometimes ambiguous: so-called "market" transactions may take on
many "firm" characteristics while "firm" arrangements may have "market"
overtones. But this ambiguity does not invalidate the usefulness of distin-
guishing between markets and firms if a clear distinction is made between
organizing methods (prices and hierarchy) and institutions (markets and
firms). The costs and benefits of any institution can then be analyzed in
terms of its relative mix of the clearly defined and conceptually distinct
"pure" categories of "price" and "hierarchy".
3. Application to the Sale of Reputation and Marketing Services
The model sketched above is useful to better understand the wide range of
contemporary economic institutions. The section explores the forms taken by
the transfer of reputation, and then turns to the institutional arrangements
made for the purchase of marketing services.
3 . 1 Reputation
When testing of a product results in its destruction (as in the case of
restaurant meals or hotel nights), the quality of that good or service cannot
be evaluated prior to its purchase. In that case, trademarks become symbols of
quality and obviate the need for trial before purchase. Because trademarks
economize on search costs, buyers are willing to pay premium prices for goods
and services bearing the trademark. Once established, a trademark can be sold
to independent producers of the good or can be exploited directly by the
trademark ' s creator
.
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Production of the trademarked goods requires the joint effort of the
trademark owner and of local factors of production. Theoretically this
cooperation can be achieved through prices (a pure sale of the trademark to
cooperating labor), through hierarchy (having the trademark owner hire labor),
or through a mix of those two methods. Two examples of these latter options
are contracts under which independent producers rent the use of the trademark
subject to a number of behavior constraints (franchising), and bonuses which
reward hired labor above and beyond their set wage.
The variables which affect the choice between prices and hierarchy are
conceptually similar to those described in our treatment of agricultural
institutions. Entrepreneurs who buy a trademark to use it on their product
have incentives to run down the goodwill capital of the trademark by reducing
the quality of the good produced and sold under the trademark. This is because
costs can be reduced by reducing quality, while prices and customers can be
maintained because of the reputation of the trademark. If consumers are
mobile, changes in quality by one producer will equally affect all other
producers using the trademark. If detection of changes in product quality is
costly, the producer who reduces quality will be able to capture the gains
from his behavior, while shifting the losses to all other producers using the
trademark.
In theory, the exchange of trademarks could be organized through the
price system. A market for reputation would be set up, in which producers who
reduce quality would pay all other trademark users a sum equal to the marginal
loss imposed on them (and vice-versa for quality improvements). The high cost
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of detecting variations in quality and of pricing their impact on all other
producers sharing the trademark—the high cost of cheating— makes this
solution impractical (McManus, 1972).
Pure hierarchy can also be used for the exchange of trademarks. Under
this strategy, the trademark owner pays employees a fixed wage to operate his
outlets. This drastically reduces cheating because employees running outlets
no longer have incentives to reduce quality. But, as argued previously,
reducing the link between profits and salary also reduces incentives to work.
Hence this solution inflicts shirking costs on the trademark owner. Shirking
costs are likely to be particularly high when production must be decentralized
and outlets are dispersed, making subpar performance costly to detect.
Whenever shirking costs are substantial, it will be efficient to choose
solutions which combine the benefits of price and hierarchy. For example,
under a franchising contract, the trademark owner will permit the producer
(the franchisee) to make most of the production decisions and to keep most of
the profits from the venture. The reduction of shirking costs achieved by
franchising is significant: Shelton (1967) reports that, for an unnamed
franchise chain, the net revenue/sales ratio was 1.8 percent for outlets
operated by employees of the trademark owner, compared to 9.5 percent for
those run by franchisees. Sales fell on average by 7.3 percent whenever the
trademark owner had to send employees to temporarily operate the outlets,
whereas they increased on average by 19.1 percent when new franchisees took
over the outlets from company employees.
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Although franchising reduces shirking, it encourages cheating. Conse-
quently, trademark owners impose behavior constraints on franchisees. These
contractual constraints specify in detail minimum quality standards which must
be met by the franchisee. Franchising contracts may also require that inputs
be purchased from the trademark owner so as to restrict the franchisee's
ability to reduce quality. The level of cheating by franchisees will depend on
the trademark owner's ability to write enforceable contracts specifying all
relevant aspects of quality. Whenever writing and enforcing such contracts is
costly, the trademark owner will operate his own outlets. These considerations
explain why trademark-owners operate their own outlets in banking, adver-
tising, accounting and management consulting, while they franchise hotels,
employment services, and car rental operations (Hennart, 1982).
Because monitoring costs may vary across outlets, a trademark owner may
run some of his outlets with employees, and others with franchisees. We would
expect a franchisor to operate the larger, more accessible units with
employees, and to franchise smaller, more dispersed units. Indeed Brickly and
Dark (1987) found that the probability that an outlet was franchised was
greater the greater its distance from the trademark owner's headquarters.
3.2 Marketing Services
As in the case of the transfer of reputation, marketing services can be
obtained by a variety of methods. Those services can be purchased in the
market from independent agents—called manufacturer representatives, or
"reps"—or they can be obtained from salaried employees. In practice, most
arrangements combine price constraints (commissions) and behavior constraints
(employee relationships).
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A manufacturer can purchase marketing services from reps. Reps are
independent contractors who pay their own sales expenses and are paid commis-
sions on the sales they make. One powerful reason for using reps is the
potentially high level of shirking costs in selling. There is very little
correlation in selling between behavior and outcome, making it extremely
difficult to determine what a salesperson must do to successfully close a
sale. Because salespersons often visit customers in a wide variety of loca-
tions, close supervision is costly. Using reps frees manufacturers from having
to direct and monitor the behavior of salespersons, as reps are incited to use
their own methods since they are rewarded in function of their performance
(Anderson, 1985). The drawbacks of this solution are as expected: not all
aspects of a salesperson's performance are equally easy to measure. Reps
rewarded by commissions can be expected to maximize their income by minimizing
those aspects of performance which demand their time and effort but are
difficult to observe. Reps will minimize product demonstration, instruction,
and after-sales service (Wilkins, 1970), and will maximize their income by
selling established products (as opposed to new ones) to smaller, regular
accounts (as opposed to new and large accounts) (Anderson and Oliver, 1987).
They also may indulge in unethical practices, such as misrepresenting product
characteristics or customer needs (Anderson, 1988; Robertson and Anderson,
1990)
.
Costs associated with reliance on reps can be classified as cheating
costs, and can, in theory, be overcome by investing additional resources in
measuring more accurately the relevant dimensions of sales performance and in
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adjusting commissions to reflect the relative costs and benefits to the
manufacturers they represent. In practice, however, high measurement costs
typically lead manufacturers to complement price constraints with behavior
constraints. For example, the contracts signed by British manufacturers with
their overseas reps around the turn of the century stipulated minimum input
requirements covering the amount of traveling, advertising, and showing the
rep was required to do. Contracts also fixed the level of stocks to be held by
the rep, required reps to employ engineers or salesmen with technical
knowledge of the manufacturer's products, and gave the manufacturer the right
to refuse orders, to monitor stocks and to inspect the sales records
(Nicholas, 1983).
When the imposition of price constraints on reps results in high cheating
costs, it may be necessary to replace most price constraints by behavior
constraints. For example, contracts which require reps to promote new products
or to adopt low-pressure, expertise-based sales tactics are difficult to draft
and to enforce, as the output of reps is then difficult to measure in the
short run. Switching to full behavior constraints will reduce organizing costs
if the behavior of employed salespersons is relatively easy to monitor
(Anderson and Oliver, 1987). n
However, the lack of output incentives in an employment situation will
encourage shirking. Shirking can be controlled by reintroducing price controls
and paying salespeople a salary plus a commission related to the volume of
their sales. If constraining behavior exhibits diminishing returns, one would
expect most compensation plans to incorporate both price and behavior con-
straints. A study by Coughlan and Sen (1986) of sales compensation plans in US
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industry between 1972 and 1982 confirms this view: salary-plus-commission
plans accounted for 70 to 75 percent of all plans (with salary accounting for
80 percent of total pay), salary-only plans for 15 to 25 percent, and commis-
sion-only plans for less than 10 percent. The model developed in this paper
suggests that the share of commission in an employee total compensation
package should increase the easier it is to measure output, the costlier it is
to monitor behavior, and the less important are demonstration and service.
These three factors were found to be significant in John and Weitz's (1989)
study of sales compensation plans.
We have seen that the exchange of reputation and of marketing services
takes a variety of forms, but that the most commonly observed arrangements
contain both price and behavior constraints. The particular mix that will be
chosen will depend on the levels of cheating and shirking costs that result
from the transaction.
4. Limits to the Use of Price Incentives in Firms
One implication of the model sketched in Section 2 and applied in Section
3 is that firms introduce price incentives to reduce the high cost of con-
straining employee behavior. The higher that cost, the more likely that firms
will rely on these incentives. However, using price incentives is not a
panacea, for it re-introduces cheating costs.
Under the hierarchical method of organizing, rewarding workers for
following managerial directives shifts to the employer the task of knowing how
workers are to perform their tasks. Employees are less likely to collect and
volunteer information relevant to that process because doing does not benefit
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them directly. Employers must also deduce performance from behavior: oppor-
tunities for shirking, and hence the use of price incentives in firms,
increase if observed behavior does not provide good clues about the quality
and /or the quantity of work performed. The level of managerial capabilities
should also influence the use of price incentives in firms. Less competent
employers will have to devote more resources in learning what employees must
do and in monitoring their behavior, ceteris paribus, than more competent
employers. One would expect greater use of price incentives when management
incurs high costs in gathering information on workers' production function and
in monitoring their behavior than when management can perform these tasks
relatively cheaply.
This brief argument indicates that: (1) the use of price incentives
within firms should be relatively greater the lower the level of managerial
expertise. Improvements in managerial techniques should reduce their use,
ceteris paribus; (2) at any point in time, large and diversified firms should
make greater use of price incentives than small and non-diversified ones; (3)
employers will use price incentives for those activities about which they have
limited knowledge and/or those which are costly to supervise.
Price incentives take two main forms in firms. Under piece work and
commission schemes, part or all of the pay of a worker is linked to his
output. The compensation of managers may also be tied to the performance of
their subordinates. This requires that their units be organized as profit
centers. The sections that follow discuss these options in detail.
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4 . 1 Piece work
Piecework saves on monitoring costs: it frees management from having to
know how workers can best perform their tasks and from monitoring their
behavior. Piecework harnesses the idiosyncratic knowledge that workers may
have on how to most efficiently perform their job. Whenever it is more costly
for employers than for employees to obtain that knowledge, workers paid by the
piece should achieve higher output than those paid on salary, and piecework
schemes will be implemented. Clark (1984) cites the results of a number of
studies which compare the hourly rates of pieceworkers versus hourly workers
in a number of different occupations. Overall, pieceworkers earned between 13
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and 2 5 percent more than hourly workers.
Piecework and its variants are found when entrepreneurs experience high
costs constraining the behavior of their employees. This is the case when
activities are geographically dispersed, such as in sales and in agriculture
(as described above) and in construction (Eccles, 1981). Piecework and its
associated price incentives were commonplace in the 19th century, before the
development of sophisticated management techniques. Under the system of
"inside contracting" a capitalist provided floor space, raw materials and
machinery to a subcontractor and paid him a piece rate for his output. These
subcontractors in turn hired their own employees, and trained, monitored, and
paid them (Buttrick, 1952). In mining, inside contracting was known as the
"butty" or the "tribute" system (Jenkin, 1948).
The reasons for the existence and the demise of inside contracting are
consistent with our model. Inside contracting was chosen because "it supplied
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a 'self-acting stimulus' which dispensed with the necessity of incessant
supervision of the managing foreman by the employer" (Taylor, 1960, p. 216).
In short, it was "a method of evading management" (Pollard, 1965, p. 38). As
we would expect, the maximization of effort by inside contractors led them to
free ride on the dimensions of performance which were not priced. Workers
abused machinery and wasted materials and work-in-process inventories
(Buttrick, 1952; Williamson, 1975). In mining, there was a tendency to work
only the best quality ore (Hillman, 1984).
Under the influence of "scientific management," inside contracting was
displaced at the turn of the century by a system of "straight" piece work
where wage-earning specialist supervisors set output norms and piece prices.
This system was in turn replaced by hourly pay in the 1920s (Gospel, 1983). In
tin mining, the development of scientific prospecting methods made it unneces-
sary to rely on the miner's tacit knowledge of where to find veins, while the
replacement of the pick by the electrical rock drill—a machine too costly to
be abused—made close supervision cost-effective. Both factors sealed the fate
of inside contracting in tin mining (Burke, 1982).
4.2 Profit centers
An examination of benefits and costs of hierarchical and price-based
methods of organizing can also explain why firms choose to set up profit
centers. As firms grow in scope and in geographical reach, the cost of
constraining employee behavior increases. Product diversification reduces the
technical knowledge that headquarters (HQ) has of the production function used
by subunits. Geographical dispersion, especially if it involves foreign
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countries, increases the difficulty of evaluating the performance of subunit
managers, because both distance and variations in local conditions make
interpretation of behavior more difficult.
Using price incentives can help alleviate this problem. Price incentives
can be used at the level of the subunit by (1) separating the firm into "guasi
firms" (profit centers) which buy their inputs and sell their outputs at arm's
length to other subunits; (2) giving full freedom to the subunit manager to
maximize the profit of the subunit; and (3) rewarding subunit managers as a
function of these results. This solution has been called the multidivisional
(or M-form) organizational structure (Chandler, 1962; Williamson, 1975).
What benefits can the M-form structure offer? In situations where subunit
managers know better than HQ how to maximize profits, rewarding them in
proportion to these profits and giving them free rein to achieve these profits
will yield higher profits than directing their actions from HQ. Subunit
managers will be incited to make use of their specialized knowledge for their
own—and therefore for the firm's—benefit. If all internal interactions are
correctly priced, the firm will elicit from its subunit managers exactly the
same behavior than it would obtain through perfect behavior control, but with
zero monitoring costs. Hence, the higher the cost of monitoring subunit
managers, the greater the benefits of M-form structures. Since both product
and geographical diversity increase monitoring costs, diversified firms should
benefit more from M-form structures than non-diversified ones. Chandler's
study of the adoption of the M-form supports this point (1962). Mahoney (1990)
found that geographic dispersion and product diversification were significant
determinants of the adoption of the M-form by 291 large U.S. firms.
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The practical problems of setting up profit centers provide a good
illustration of the unwelcome side-effects of using price incentives in firms.
To maximize their own income, managers of subunits will maximize the yearly
profits made by their units. In the process, they will maximize the use of
unpriced (or undervalued) inputs and minimize that of unpriced (or under-
valued) outputs. For example, if HQ does not assign a price to a firm's loss
of reputation which results from a subunit s unethical behavior, then subunit
managers can be expected to engage in profitable, but shady business prac-
tices. To avoid such unanticipated and undesirable side-effects, all inputs
and outputs used and produced by the profit center—including intangibles such
as reputation and experience—need to be priced to reflect their cost and
benefit to the firm as a whole. This is an impossible task. The firm owes its
very existence to the fact that some interactions between its parts cannot be
organized through a price system. If all interactions could be priced, there
would be no benefits to organizing within the firm. The number and relative
importance of non-priceable interactions will vary across firms and even
within firms. The proportion of non-priceable interactions is expected to be
high in vertically integrated firms and in those whose subunits receive
continuous innovations from a centralized R&D or market research facility. In
each of these cases the market for the relevant inputs (tacit knowledge,
reputation, or raw materials) is characterized by high transaction costs,
making some form of hierarchy the preferred organizing method (Hennart, 1982;
1990). Supplementing hierarchy with intrafirm markets to transfer such inputs
and outputs between subunits generates pricing problems and results in
suboptimization. l
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To check the generation of unwanted side-effects and to encourage
desirable ones, HQ may supplement transfer prices with behavior constraints.
The subunit manager will be told to maximize profits, but, in addition, he
will be asked to transfer fixed quantities of inputs or outputs at fixed
prices to other subunits, obey HQ directives on ethical behavior, worker
safety, pollution control, and the like. This represents a shift back towards
hierarchy, and it reduces the advantages of profit centers. As the autonomy of
subunit managers declines, so will their incentive to work hard and show
initiative. HQ will now have to spend more resources directing and monitoring
the subunit' s manager's behavior. Both the informational simplicity and the
motivational virtues of profit centers will be reduced. Hence the mix of price
and behavior constraints faced by profit center managers should vary in direct
proportion to the difficulty of pricing internal transactions. When internal
transfers of inputs and outputs are few and can be easily priced, profit
center managers should have considerable freedom to buy or sell from whomever
they like at whatever price they may negotiate. In the words of Eccles (1985),
they should have "full exchange autonomy". Conversely, whenever internal
transactions are numerous and difficult to price, HQ will dictate from whom
managers may buy, to whom they may sell, and the prices for these transac-
tions. There are fewer exchanges of raw materials, reputation, and know-how in
diversified firms than in single-business, vertically integrated concerns, and
hence profit center managers should have greater autonomy in the former than
in the latter.
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Studies of profit centers in firms support this view. Eccles (1985, p.
114) found that 39 percent of the heads of profit centers of the US firms he
studied had full exchange autonomy. As expected, that percentage was higher
(50.5 percent) for highly diversified firms (unrelated businesses) than for
single business, vertically integrated firms (29 percent). Another way of
evaluating how much exchange autonomy profit centers have (and hence of
ascertaining the degree to which price incentives are used) is to look at the
type of transfer pricing used in transactions between profit centers. Transfer
at market prices are dysfunctional if there are significant non-priceable
exchanges between subunits. As expected, Hill, Hitt, and Hoskisson (1990)
found that firms that were highly diversified had a greater propensity to use
market-based transfer prices for internal transactions than undiversif ied
firms. This supports the view that the use of profit center in firms is
limited by the costs of specifying and enforcing market transactions.
Earlier we have argued that using price incentives reduces shirking but
necessarily increases cheating. Re-introducing price incentives in firms can
take the form of piece-work schemes and of profit centers. Both of these
techniques suffer from an unwelcome side-effect, the reappearance of cheating
costs. The evidence shows that piece work and profit centers tend to be used
whenever they significantly reduce shirking costs with only a minimum increase
in cheating costs.
5 . Contribution of the model
The preceding pages have developed a "comparative institutional" model in
which economic institutions are analyzed as a mix of two pure organizing
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methods, hierarchy and the price system. The comparative institutional model
defines firms as institutions which rely primarily on behavior constraints,
and markets as institutions which use mostly price incentives. The fact that
most institutions we observe have both firm and market characteristics and do
not fit into the polar categories of firm and market as they are usually
described in the transaction cost literature is explained by increasing
organizing costs as one specializes into using either pure price or pure
hierarchical methods. This paper shows that no special theory is needed to
account for hybrid institutions; they can be analyzed as combinations of the
two organizing methods of price and hierarchy. For example, the model locates
contracts in the continuum between market and firms, and defines them as
consisting of limited behavior constraints within dominant price constraints.
The comparative institutional model sketched above differs significantly
from some of the other approaches in the literature. In contrast to some
agency models— for example Eisenhardt (1985)— it does not argue that differen-
ces in risk aversion between principal and agents help explain the choice
between price and behavior constraints. The comparative institutional model is
based on a general theory of market failure, in which asset specificity is
only one cause of such failure. The model not only considers shirking as the
main cost of hierarchy, but it also shows that shirking is a necessary conse-
quence of reducing market transaction costs. In that sense, the comparative
institutional model differs from Ouchi (1979). The model shows that prices and
hierarchy differ in efficiency because they use different methods to organize
activities, and that the comparative advantage that firms have over markets in
organizing certain transactions derive from their greater reliance on hie-
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rarchy. Hence the comparative institutional model answers Demsetz's (1988, p.
149) call for a theory which clearly differentiates between the cost of
transacting and that of managing. In the comparative institutional model, the
cost of transacting is the cost of measuring output in all of its dimensions;
the cost of managing is the cost of directing and observing behavior.
Lastly, the model clarifies the relationship between hierarchy and firms.
By reviewing the problems incurred in using price incentives within firms, it
shows that the use of hierarchy is a sine-qua-non condition for the existence
of firms. Firms arise because some interactions are more efficiently organized
by behavior than by price control. Every single interaction that takes place
within firms does not, however, require full behavior control, so it is
efficient to use prices (fully, or in conjunction with behavior controls) to
organize some intra-firm interactions. But, in all cases, a core of transac-
tions will remain organized through behavior constraints.
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ENDNOTES
1. Eccles and White (1988) documents some of the practical problems of using
prices within firms and note that the managers of the firms studied judged
internal transactions to be more troublesome than external ones. Williamson
(1985, chapter 6) has argued that these distortions are of two types. First,
there is a tendency for the division manager who is judged by immediate net
receipts to maximize short term gains at the expense of long-term ones. Second,
the determination of transfer prices is subject to political distortions
2. The model is applicable only to those cases where institutions are not
sheltered from competition by monopoly rights or by government intervention. We
would, for example, expect the model to have greater applicability to firms in
competitive industries than to government bureaus. This is not to deny that
there is a varying degree of inertia in economic institutions. At any point,
some inefficient forms will be observed.
3. A parallel analysis could be done by focusing on information costs. A complete
analysis would naturally require the simultaneous consideration of enforcement,
bargaining, and information costs.
4. Note that they do it "in complete disregard of the decision of others, or
even the existence of others" (Demsetz, 1988). This is because prices reflect
perfectly the social consequences of each agent's actions.
5. In some cases measurement costs may be so high that some goods cannot be
priced. They will carry a zero price, as with clean air or noise. This
constitutes an extreme case of "market failure."
6. Shirking takes place when the employee offers "perfunctory" as opposed to
"consummate" cooperation. Perfunctory cooperation is compliance with directives,
while consummate cooperation involves accepting responsibilities and exercising
initiative (Blau and Scott, 1962, p. 140; Williamson, 1975, p. 69).
7. Alternatively, employers can persuade workers to internalize the employer's
values. For further discussion see Ouchi (1981) and Barney (1986).
8. If landlords increased rents to cover the expected level of damage to the
land, the only renters willing to rent would be extremely opportunistic ones.
Adverse selection would eventually kill the market. See Akerlof (1970).
9. The record of using large numbers of wage laborers in the production of space-
intensive crops is one of consistent failure. As Olson (1964) notes, the big
"bonanza farms" of the turn of the century were failures. The disastrous results
achieved by Soviet collectivized agriculture are well know. In the 1970s, a
number of large corporations entered U.S. agriculture, with similar results
(Cordtz 1982).
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10. Partnerships, joint ventures, and profit sharing have the same incentive
structure as sharecropping.
11. Salaried salespersons are rewarded on the basis of their behavior. The five
most common criteria by which sales managers evaluated their employees were (in
descending order): attitude, product knowledge, selling skills, appearance and
manners, communication skills and sales volume (tied) (Jackson, Keith and
Schlacter, 1983).
12. This cannot be due to self-selection, since firms using time rates have
the possibility to fire least-efficient workers and to keep the most efficient
ones.
13. Intertemporal suboptimization is also a problem. Subunits are not free-
standing entities, guoted on local stock markets. There is therefore no easy
way to evaluate the impact of the subsidiary manager's present decisions on the
subsidiary's future profit stream. If the manager is rewarded on the basis of
annual profits, he can be expected to maximize present income at the expense of
future profits by a variety of stratagems, such as cutting R&D budgets, or
cutting employment and jeopardizing long-term government relations.
14. Only half of all transfers were at market or negotiated prices.
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Table 1
Behavior and Price Constraints
in Agricultural Institutions
Behavior constraints Price constraints
on land use on work effort
Pure rent none full
Rental few high
contract
Sharecropping some medium
Employee paid many some
through
piece-work
Pure full none
employment
contract
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